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Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia,
Yugoslavia, and Haiti - Revisiting the
Validity of Humanitarian Intervention
Under International Law - Part I*
VED P. NANDA**
I. INTRODUCTION
Several recent situations call for a reexamination of "humanitarian
intervention," a controversial international law doctrine that suffers from
normative ambiguities.' These situations include: (1) the Kurdish plight
in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War; (2) the tragedy of the
Liberian civil war; (3) the protracted civil war in Yugoslavia between
Croats and Serbs; and (4) the brutal oppression in Haiti following the
* Part II will appear in a forthcoming issue of the DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y.
** Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Stud-
ies Program, University of Denver College of Law. This is an expanded version of my re-
marks at a conference in June 1991 in Honolulu, Hawaii, entitled, "Restructuring for Peace:
Challenges for the 21st Century," and sponsored by the Matsunaga Institute for Peace and
East-West Center, University of Hawaii, and the United Nations University. I gratefully
acknowledge the research assistance of Ed Allen, a third-year student at the University of
Denver College of Law, on the sections on Uganda and Kampuchea. See also Decades of
Disaster: The United Nations' Response, Hearing Before the House Select Committee on
Hunger (July 30, 1991), 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 21-24, 66-86 (testimony and prepared
statement, respectively, by Ved Nanda, entitled, "A United Nations Convention on the
Right to Food, Humanitarian Intervention, and the U.N. Response to International Disas-
ters - An International Law Perspective").
1. Voluminous literature exists on the subject. See generally FERNANDO R. TES6N, Hu-
MANITARIAN INTERVENTION - AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988) [hereinafter
TESON]; MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 107-08 (1977); HUMANITARIAN INTERVEN-
TION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973), and the authorities cited id. at
229-234; Michael Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in
Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547 (1987); Cap-
tain Thomas E. Behuniak, The Law of the Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by
Armed Force: A Legal Survey, 79 MIL. L. REV. 157 (1978); Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian
Intervention, in LAW AND THE CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John Norton Moore
ed., 1974); H. Scott Farley, State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International
Law: Reopening Pandora's Box, 10 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 29 (1980); Tom J. Farer, Human
Rights in Lao's Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (1991); Jean-Pierre
L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention:
Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter, 4 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1974); James A.R.
Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Power,
20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9 (1991); Kevin Ryan, Rights, Intervention and Self-Determi-
nation, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55 (1991); Ved P. Nanda, Humanitarian Military
Intervention, 23 WORLD VIEW, Oct. 1978, at 23; Eisuke Suzuki, A State's Provisional Com-
petence to Protect Human Rights in a Foreign State, 15 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 231 (1980).
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ouster of a democratically elected government by military leaders.
Competing claims based on territorial integrity versus humanitarian
assistance present a dilemma for the publicist and the decision-maker
alike. It may be recalled that Iraq invoked traditional rules of interna-
tional law - sovereignty and territorial integrity - to claim that the
world community was prohibited from intervening in its internal affairs.2
Despite frequent challenges on these grounds, a persistent issue presents
itself: Is there an emerging right, and perhaps even a duty, on the part of
the world community to intervene in the internal affairs of a state when
egregious violations of basic human rights occur there?
This article and a later companion piece examine the pertinent issues
involved in a determination of the validity under international law of
claims to humanitarian intervention. Part I will examine the recent for-
eign intervention in Iraq, the presence of U.S. and allied forces to estab-
lish safe havens, and the stationing of the United Nations guards in
northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from the forces of Saddam Hussein -
all of which occurred pursuant to U.N. Security Council action under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
3
The thesis of these articles goes a step further. The right to provide
humanitarian assistance exists even in those situations where Chapter VII
is not invoked, suggesting that the doctrine of nonintervention should be
interpreted in light of the equally strong and complementary norms of
international human rights law. The right to provide humanitarian assis-
tance must be balanced against the duty of nonintervention. The choice
between these complementary norms, the former reflecting developments
in international human rights law and the latter reflecting state sover-
eignty with its attributes of territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence, must be based on specific criteria which I will enunciate.
First, this article analyzes humanitarian intervention as an exception
to nonintervention, the widely recognized principle of customary interna-
tional law.4 This is followed by six case studies of unilateral state inter-
vention, justified by the intervening state in part on grounds of humani-
tarian intervention. The next section applies the doctrine to the Kurdish
situation. Finally, the paper concludes with an appraisal and
recommendations.
In Part II, which will be published at a future date, I will discuss the
situations in Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti.
2. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iraq Rejects European Plan for Kurdish Haven in North,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at A12.
3. See S.C. Res. 688, Apr. 5, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991) [hereinafter S/
RES/688].
4. See, e.g., Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nica-
ragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14, 106-110 [hereinafter
Nicaragua v. U.S.].
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II. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
If intervention is to be defined as "interference by a State in the do-
mestic or foreign affairs of others in opposition to its will and serving by
its design or implication to impair its political independence, 5 the con-
clusion is inescapable that, under state practice, nonintervention has be-
come a governing principle of international law.0
The principle of nonintervention is premised on respect for sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and is an adjunct
to the principle of the nonuse of force embodied in Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter.' Numerous resolutions, declarations, and con-
ventions adopted by international organizations and conferences reflect
state acceptance of the principle of nonintervention as customary interna-
tional law. To illustrate, the 1928 Convention on the Duties and Rights of
States in the Event of Civil Strife prohibited intervention even by nation-
als of one state in the affairs of another state.' In 1933, the Montevideo
Convention on Rights and Duties of States9 explicitly stated that no state
"has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of an-
other."' 0 Three years later, the Buenos Aires Additional Protocol Relative
to Non-Intervention affirmed that the parties "declare inadmissible the
intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever
reason in the internal or external affairs of any of the contracting
parties.""
Following the Second World War, the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) 2 reaffirmed the inviolability of the
territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of each mem-
ber state.'" The following year, the Charter of the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS) 4 stated in Article 15:
5. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES 246 (1945). Oppenheim defines intervention as "dictatorial interfer-
ence in the affairs of a state by another state." See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305
(H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
6. See Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 4.
7. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter reads: "All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
8. Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife,
Feb. 20, 1948, 46 Stat. 2749, T.S. 814, 134 L.N.T.S. 45, art. 1.
9. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 STAT. 3097, T.S. 881,
165 L.N.T.S. 19.
10. Id. at art. 8.
11. Additional Protocol Relative to Non-intervention, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 41, T.S.
923, 188 L.N.T.S. 31, art. 1.
12. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77.
13. Id. at arts. 1 and 6.
14. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21
1992
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No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed
force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic,
and cultural elements.
Article 17 of the O.A.S. Charter is unequivocal in its prohibition on
intervention: "The Territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of
force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds
whatever." Charters of other regional organizations, including the Organi-
zation of African Unity, 5 Pact of the League of Arab States, 6 and Treaty
of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (the now defunct
Warsaw Pact), 7 contain similar prohibitions.
Pertinent United Nations declarations include the 1965 Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty,"8 which
stated that "no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political,
or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain
from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign right or to secure
from it advantages of any kind." Five years later, the General Assembly
adopted a Declaration on Principles of Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation Among States,"9 which approved the principles
enunciated in the 1965 Declaration as the "basic principles" of interna-
tional law.
2 0
The International Court of Justice noted in its decision on the merits
in the case of Nicaragua v. U.S. that, "in view of the generally accepted
formulations, the principle [of nonintervention] forbids all States or
groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external
affairs of other States."' 2' Earlier, in the 1949 Corfu Channel case, 22 the
International Court of Justice had stated:
[T]he alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of the policy
of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and
such as cannot . . . find a place in international law . . . [especially
U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. 6847.
15. See Charter of Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art. III, reprinted in 2
I.L.M. 766 (1963).
16. Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 8, 70 U.N.T.S. 237.
17. Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955, art. 8,
219 U.N.T.S. 3.
18. G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/6220
(1965).
19. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970).
20. For a discussion of this declaration, see Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 4, at 100,
107.
21. Supra note 4, at 108.
22. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4.
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when] it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might
easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice
itself.2
States, however, have not faithfully complied with the principle of
nonintervention, for history is replete with instances of state intervention.
In the post-War era, superpowers have often used coercive measures, di-
rectly or indirectly, against other states in flagrant violation of this princi-
ple. Examples abound: the U.S. interventions in the Dominican Republic,
Viet Nam, Grenada, and Nicaragua; the Soviet interventions in Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. Similar instances can be cited
in Angola, Mozambique, and Central America. The point is that states
regularly justify forcible intervention by invoking complementary norms
of international law, such as self-defense and collective self-defense.
As an exception to the general prohibition on intervention, states
have, however, traditionally asserted their right to intervene on humani-
tarian grounds to protect their own nationals or a third state's nationals
in another state, or even the nationals of the state against which coercive
measures were undertaken.2 ' Most publicists writing in the late 19th cen-
tury and at the turn of the 20th century supported this assertion on the
assumption that if a state denied certain minimum basic rights to the
people within its territory, any other state could remedy the situation by
intervention.25 In the words of one commentator, such intervention was,
however, justified only "in extreme cases . . . where great evils existed,
great crimes were being perpetrated, or where there was danger of race
extermination."26 Similarly, another commentator considers intervention
permissible on the grounds of "tyrannical conduct of a government to-
wards its subjects, massacres and brutality in a civil war, or religious
persecution. '2 7
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is subject to a major criti-
cism: only powerful states are able to exercise the alleged right, and hence
they are likely to abuse it, especially since international law has tradition-
ally lacked effective safeguards against such abuse. Professor Ian Brown-
lie contends that humanitarian intervention was, in fact, occasionally
abused during the 19th century, and had fallen into disuse by 1945.28 An-
other observer, however, concludes after his study of state practice, that,
while divergences certainly existed as to the circumstances in which
23. Id. at 35.
24. See authorities cited in Fonteyne, supra note 1, at 214-226.
25. See, e.g., id.; IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
338 nn. 1-5 (1963) for citations to the works of these publicists. See also ELLERY C. STOW-
ELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1921); ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES IN CONFORMITY WITH ACTUAL PRACTICE 349 (1931).
26. AMOS S. HERSHEY, ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANIZATION 239
(rev. ed. 1927).
27. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (4th ed. 1895).
28. See BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 338-42.
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resort could be had to the institution of humanitarian intervention, as
well as to the manner in which such operations were to be conducted,
the principle itself was widely, if not unanimously, accepted as an in-
tegral part of customary international law.
29
Opponents of humanitarian intervention contend that the prohibi-
tion on the use of force, which is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, should be interpreted broadly and consistently with its plain
language. Consequently, they argue, there is no scope for considering hu-
manitarian intervention as a valid exception to the Article 2(4) norm. 0
On the other hand, one can claim validity for humanitarian interven-
tion by: (1) arguing that the proper interpretation of Article 2(4) would
be to proscribe the use of force when it is directed at sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity, or political independence of a state; (2) suggesting that hu-
manitarian intervention, by definition, does not seek to challenge these
attributes; or (3) focusing on the promotion and protection of human
rights as constituting an important obligation under the United Nations
Charter. 1 Also, the doctrine was widely accepted by states and publicists
alike under traditional international law.32
In the U.N. era, unilateral humanitarian intervention remains highly
controversial. Although publicists generally view it with skepticism, a pro-
ponent, Professor Tes6n, has recently suggested after studying four such
cases - the 1979 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, the 1979 French
intervention in central Africa, the 1971 Indian intervention in East Paki-
stan, and the 1983 U.S. intervention in Grenada - that state sovereignty
and prohibition of the use of force should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with "other well-established principles - those that have to do
with upholding a modicum of human dignity."3 He concludes: "The
problem of the legal status of humanitarian intervention is not a problem
of fidelity to international law. Rather, it is one of determination of the
law and of proper balance between competing principles." 4
29. Fonteyne, supra note 1, at 235.
30. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 342; Tom Franck & Nigel Rodley, After Ban-
gladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275,
299-302 (1973). See also Nigel Rodley, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The
Case Law of the World Court, 38 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 321, 327-28 (1989): "The burden of the
[I.C.J.'s] message [in Nicaragua v. U.S.] is that the United States could not [justify its mili-
tary activities]; and, in the process, it has confirmed the view of those of us who argue that
the doctrine of unilateral armed humanitarian intervention has no justification at law."
(Footnote omitted).
31. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1, 55 and 56.
32. See, e.g., authorities cited in supra notes 24-25.
33. TEs6N, supra note 1, at 200.
34. Id. (emphasis in original). See also id. at 245: "The right of humanitarian interven-
tion is consistent with the United Nations Charter and positively supported by state prac-
tice, when both are examined in light of [a] normative theory [under which rights of states
derive from human rights]." See also Bazyler, supra note 1, at 619:
Recent history shows the need for the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion. Nations must be prepared to utilize the doctrine where necessary - not
VOL. 20:2
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An observer must nevertheless acknowledge the absence of a general
consensus on the definition of humanitarian intervention, the set of crite-
ria to judge its permissibility or impermissibility under international law,
and the safeguards necessary to prevent its abuse. However, a limited use
of humanitarian intervention, consisting of claims to rescue one's nation-
als or a third state's nationals, is generally regarded as permissible under
international law, even though it causes a temporary breach of a state's
territorial integrity.3 5 To illustrate, the Restatement (Third) of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States"6 states:
It is increasingly accepted that a state may take steps to rescue
victims or potential victims in an action strictly limited to that pur-
pose and not likely to involve disproportionate destruction of life or
property in the state where the rescue takes place. Whether a state
may intervene with military force in the territory of another state
without its consent, not to rescue the victims but to prevent or termi-
nate human rights violations, is not agreed or authoritatively deter-
mined. Such intervention might be acceptable if taken pursuant to
resolution of a United Nations body or of a regional organization such
as the Organization of American States. 7
It should be added that any use of force is subject to the limitations
of "necessity" and "proportionality."3 8
III. CASE STUDIES
In this section, I will examine six cases of unilateral state interven-
tion in which a claim was made that intervention was based in part on
humanitarian grounds: the United States' 1965 intervention in the Do-
minican Republic, 9 1983 intervention in Grenada,4" and 1989 interven-
only because of principles of justice, but also on practical grounds. Inaction
now sows the seeds of future massacres. The world cannot 'sing away the atroc-
ities in Ethiopia.
35. See, e.g., the statement by the U.S. representative during the U.N. Security Council
debate on the Entebbe rescue mission by Israel, in which he justified Israel's action:
There is a well established right to use limited force for the protection of
one's own nationals from the imminent threat of injury or death in a situation
where the States in whose territory they are located is either unwilling or una-
ble to protect them. The right ... is limited to such use of force as is neces-
sary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury.
U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1941 (1976).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987).
37. Id. at § 703 Comment e. See also id. at § 905.
38. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, RIGHT V. MIGHT - INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 45 (2d ed.
1991). See generally Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1620 (1984); Symposium: The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era, 20 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1991).
39. See infra § I11(A).
40. See infra § IIl(E).
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tion in Panama; 1 India's 1972 intervention in East Pakistan;" Tanzania's
1979 intervention in Uganda;48 and Vietnam's 1978 intervention in
Cambodia."
A. The 1965 U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic"
The U.S. marines landed in Santo Domingo on April 28, 1965,4 four
days after an internal conflict began in the Dominican Republic. 4 7 The
United States justified its action on several grounds,' including humani-
tarian intervention."' The State Department Memorandum outlining le-
gal bases for U.S. action in the Dominican Republic specifically stated
that the landing of the U.S. troops was "an emergency action to protect
lives," which was taken "under conditions in which immediate action was
essential to preserve the lives of ... nationals of the United States and
many other countries."5 Justifying the action on humanitarian grounds,
the Memorandum said that the action was taken
after the United States had been officially notified by Dominican au-
thorities that they were no longer able to preserve order. The factual
circumstances of the breakdown of order in the Dominican Republi-
can [sic] were such that the landing could not have been delayed be-
yond the time it actually took place without needless sacrifice of lives
... [including] foreign nationals .... 5'
Similarly, in several statements President Johnson made following
the sending of the U.S. marines to the Dominican Republic, 2 he reiter-
ated the necessity of taking this action because the military authorities in
the Dominican Republic had informed the U.S. government that lives of
American and foreign nationals were in danger, the Dominican authori-
ties were "no longer able to guarantee their safety," and the assistance of
U.S. military personnel was needed for their protection. In a statement
President Johnson made at a news conference on June 17, 1965, 3 he ex-
plicitly recalled the situation preceding his decision to send the U.S.
41. See infra § III(F).
42. See infra § III(B).
43. See infra § III(C).
44. See infra § III(D).
45. In this section I have relied extensively on my prior work, Ved Nanda, The United
States, Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order, 43 DENV. L. J. 439
(1966) (Part I); 44 DENY. L. J. 225 (1967) (Part II).
46. See N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1965, at Al.
47. See U.S. Acts to Meet Threat in Dominican Republic, 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 738
(1965) (President's statements on sending the United States marines to the Dominican
Republic).
48. See generally Nanda, supra note 45, Pt. I, at 443-44 (enumerating several claims
forwarded by the United States).
49. See id. at 472-79.
50. 111 CONG. REC. 10733 (daily ed. May 20, 1965).
51. Id. at 10734.
52. See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 738 (1965); 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 19, 20 (1965).
53. See 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 19 (1965).
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troops. He said that Ambassador Bennett was talking to him over the
phone from under his desk as he had "a thousand American men, women,
and children assembled in the hotel who were pleading with their Presi-
dent for help to preserve their lives," and while "bullets were going
through [Ambassador Bennett's] windows. 5 4 The President further said
that
as we had to go into the Congo to preserve the lives of American citi-
zens and haul them out when they were being shot at, we went into
the Dominican Republic to preserve the lives of American citizens and
the citizens of a good many other nations .... We removed 5,600
people from 46 nations, and we didn't sprain an ankle doing it.""
This assertion was reiterated by several United States government
officials, including Ambassadors Bunker," Stevenson 57 and Bennett;58
Secretary of State Rusk;59 Undersecretaries Mann60 and Ball;61 Legal Ad-
viser to the Department of State Meeker;6" and the President's special
adviser to the Dominican Republic, former Ambassador Martin."
Following the U.S. intervention, on May 1, 1965, the Organization of
American States (OAS) sent a special committee to the Dominican Re-
public to offer its good offices to obtain, urgently, a cease fire.6 On May
14, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, inviting the Secre-
tary-General "to send, as an urgent measure, a representative to the Do-
minican Republic for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council on
54. Id. at 20.
55. Id.
56. See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 854, 859, 861 (1965).
57. See id. at 739-40, 876-77.
58. See 111 CONG. REc. 23668, 23669 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1965) (speech in Atlanta).
59. See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 842-43, 938 (1965) (press conference of May 26, 1965). He
said:
As late as 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that Wednesday, we had in front of
us reports from our Ambassador in which he himself was not recommending
that we use our own forces with respect to that situation. But then, as you now
know from other sources, the President and Secretary of Defense and I were in
a meeting on another matter and about 5:15 we were handed a telegram from
our Ambassador, saying that the situation had completely deteriorated, dis-
integrated, that the police and military authorities there had indicated that
they could no longer undertake responsibility for the security of American and
foreign nationals, and that if these people were to be safe, U.S. forces would
have to be employed.
Id. at 942.
60. See 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 733-34 (1965).
61. See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1045-46 (1965).
62. See 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 61-64 (1965).
63. See V. Martin, Inside the Drama and Chaos of the Dominican Upheaval, LIFE,
May 28, 1965, reprinted in 111 CONG. REc. 23299 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965).
64. See 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 741 (1965) for the text of a resolution adopted on May 1,
1965, by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, under which the
special committee was dispatched.
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the present situation.""6 The Secretary-General's representative arrived
on the scene on May 18, 1965.66 Subsequently, the bulk of the U.S. troops
formed the core of an Inter-American Peace Force which was established
with the "sole purpose" of cooperating in the restoration of normal condi-
tions in the Dominican Republic.6 7
The OAS committee was successful in negotiating a cease-fire on
May 5.68 This, however, did not last long, for on May 13, armed hostilities
started again.6 9 Eventually, on May 21, another cease-fire was arranged
through the good offices of both the United Nations and the OAS.70 This
was followed by the formation of a provisional government on September
3, 1965.1' General elections in the Dominican Republic were held in June
1966;7' a gradual withdrawal of the Inter-American forces started in July
1966 and was completed on September 21, 1966.71
Opponents of the U.S. intervention challenged the action, suggesting
that the United States had overreacted and had failed to provide suffi-
cient evidence to justify the necessity of such action,7 " and asserting that
while the action was undertaken "on the pretext of protecting American
lives," its real reason lay in other political objectives .7 However, the U.S.
is to be faulted primarily not because of its failure to meet the necessity
criterion, but on other grounds. First, its action was not limited to accom-
plishing that objective. It also claimed other objectives for its interven-
tion: (1) to prevent a Communist takeover, and (2) to take unilateral ac-
tion to give the OAS competence to address the situation.7 6 Second, the
U.S. intervention was not limited in duration; troops stayed in the Do-
minican Republic for over a year, long after there was any perceived or
claimed justification for its presence to protect American lives. Third, the
question has been raised about the validity of the request by the Domini-
can military junta for the U.S. armed forces.7 7 Finally, the action was uni-
65. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/203 (1965).
66. See U.N. Docs. S/6358, S/6365, S/6369 (1965) (Secretary-General's reports to the
Security Council on the appointment, and on his arrival in Santo Domingo).
67. For the text of the resolution establishing this force, see 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 862-63
(1965). See also U.N. Doc. S/381, at 3 (OAS Secretary-General's speech after the signing of
the Constituent Act, Inter-American Armed Forces, at Santo Domingo on May 28, 1965).
68. See OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. F/11. 10 Doc. 38 Rev., reprinted in 52 DEP'T ST. BULL.
868 (1965)(Text of the Act of Santo Domingo).
69. See generally TED SZULC, DOMINICAN DIARY 207-68 (1965).
70. For a summary report, see UN MONTHLY CHRON., 1965, at 9-10.
71. For the OAS report to the U.N. Secretary-General on the formation of the provi-
sional government, see U.N. Doc. S/6676 (1965).
72. See Paul L. Montgomery, Balaquer Defeats Bosch in Dominican Balloting, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 1966, at 1, col. 7.
73. See O.A.S. Peace Force Starts Pullout, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1966, at 16, col. 1; see
also N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1966, at 3, col. 1.
74. See Nanda, supra note 45, Pt. I, at 464-65.
75. See, e.g., UN MONTHLY CHRON., 1965, at 3, 4 (speech in the Security Council by the
Soviet representative).
76. See Nanda, supra note 45, Pt. II.
77. See id., Pt. I, at 465-67.
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lateral, without prior consultation with the OAS or the United Nations.7 8
Thus, the United States did not meet the test of proportionality.
7 9
B. India's 1971 Intervention in East Pakistan (Bangladesh)
The genesis of this intervention lies in the partition of India in 1947
which created the state of Pakistan, composed of two disparate, parts
physically separated by a distance of over 1,000 miles and also divided by
ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences. 80 The two elements tending to
bind these parts - a common religion, Islam, and alienation from India
- did not suffice to ensure stability. By the late 1960s the economic and
political domination of East Pakistan by West Pakistan had caused seri-
ous political unrest in East Pakistan.
In the Pakistani general elections of December 1970, the Awami
League party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won an overwhelming vic-
tory, capturing 167 of 313 seats in the National Assembly on a program of
political and economic autonomy for East Pakistan.81 The election results
were apparently unacceptable to the elites in West Pakistan who, un-
doubtedly, faced with some alarm the East Pakistani demand for auton-
omy and the prospects of being ruled by the East Pakistani Awami
League party.
In early 1971, negotiations for the convening of the National Assem-
bly to draft a constitution broke down, causing the simmering unrest in
East Pakistan to surface in mass demonstrations against the Pakistani
government. This crisis was intensified by Sheikh Mujib's call for non-
cooperation with the government. Serious acts of civil disobedience fol-
lowed, including refusal to pay taxes and a total strike in government
offices and businesses. The East Bengali mood began to reflect a desire
for complete independence as opposed to mere autonomy.
Eventually, on March 25, 1971, the Pakistani military struck Dacca
without warning and initiated a reign of terror throughout East Pakistan
which continued with increasing intensity until December 1971.82 Villages
78. See id. at 467-68.
79. See id. at 468-70.
80. For events leading to the eventual breakup of Pakistan, see generally Ved Nanda,
Self-Determination in International Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321, 323 (1972); Ved Nanda, A
Critique of the United Nations Inaction in the Bangladesh Crisis, 49 DENY. L. J. 53, 54-56
(1972); Choudhury, Bangladesh: Why It Happened, 48 INT'L AFF. 242 (1972); International
Commission of Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan 1971 (1972), and the authorities cited
in these publications.
81. On the election results, see Ministry of External Affairs, Republic of India, Bangla
Desh Documents, cited in 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 550 (1971); FAR EASTERN EcONOMIC
REV., Jan. 9, 1971, at 19-21. The text of the Awami League Manifesto is reprinted at 4
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 524 (1971).
82. For accounts of the alleged atrocities by the Pakistani army, see Hearings Before
the Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with the Refugees and Escapees of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 95-226, pt. II at 311-53, pt. III
at 431-81 (1971) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian
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were burned; civilians were indiscriminately killed; Hindus were mas-
sacred, as were university teachers and students, lawyers, doctors, Awami
League leaders, and Bengali military and police officials. 83 The horror of
these events led observers to accuse the Pakistani armed forces and
razakars, the local volunteer militiamen who were collaborators of the
Pakistani armed forces in East Bengal, of committing selective genocide,
purportedly to deprive East Pakistan of Bengali leadership.84
By December 1970, this wave of terror forced approximately 10 mil-
lion people to flee from East Pakistan and take refuge in India. 5 This put
a severe strain on India-Pakistan relations and on December 3, 1971, full-
scale war erupted between the two nations.
The war lasted two weeks, with horrible destruction: "Thirty million
people dislocated by the war. More than 1.5 million homes destroyed.
Nine million refugees returning from India to rebuild their lives and
homes. War damage drastically reducing rail traffic. Key rail and road
bridges destroyed.""6 According to the Swiss U.N. Chief in Dacca, Toni
Hagen, the destruction suffered by Bangladesh was greater than that suf-
fered by Europe in World War 11.87 On December 16, 1971, India won the
and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., at 35-590
(1971).
83. See Schwarz, Bloody Baptism for Bangladesh, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY,
Dec. 25, 1971, at 4, cols. 1, 3.
84. See Norman Cousins, Genocide in East Pakistan, SATURDAY REV., May 22, 1971, at
20; Shaplen, A Reporter at Large: The Birth of Bangladesh, NEW YORKER, Feb. 12, 1972, at
40, 65, where the author quotes the resident editor of the Indian Express (New Delhi) as
describing in May 1971 the Pakistani action as "a demographic war" designed to "destroy or
drive out those whom it considers immediately or prospectively undesirable." The first thor-
ough expos6 was published in Mascarenhas, SUNDAY TIMES (London), June 13, 1971, re-
printed in Senate Hearings, supra note 82, pt. 1, at 120 (with accompanying editorial at
118).
85. This is the reported number of refugees. See Mehta, Letter From West Bengal,
NEW YORKER, Dec. 11, 1971, at 166; Bengalis' Land a Vast Cemetery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1972, at 1, col. 5; Swaran Singh Says India Seeks No Pakistani Land, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1971, at 16, col. 3 (statement of India's Defense Minister Singh); THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 18, 1971, at 14, col. 1; N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1971, at 46, col. 1 (editorial); id. at
47, col. 1 (statement by John Lewis, former U.S. AID director of India, 1964-69). For a
Reuter report on the return of all the refugees to Bangladesh, see THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 28, 1972, at 19, col. 2. For a succinct account, see Crisis in South Asia - A
Report by Senator Edward M. Kennedy to the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Con-
nected with Refugees and Escapees (Nov. 1, 1971).
86. Winder, Bangladesh: a Race for Solutions, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr.
4, 1972, at 1, col. 2. See also Ved Nanda, Bangladesh Economy in Ruin, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
Oct. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
87. See Bleak Future, TIME, Feb. 28, 1972, at 30. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman estimated
that the Pakistanis may have killed three million Bengalis. See also Mujib Says Trials Are
Set For Pakistani P.O.W.'s, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1972, at 3, col. 1; TIME, Feb. 28, 1972, at
30. The police chief in Dacca is reported to have described the "slaughter of East Pakistan"
in these words: "The whole country is a mass grave. Who knows how many millions have
been killed?" 'Who Knows How Many Millions Have Been Killed' in the East?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 1971, at A14, col. 1. A New York Times correspondent reported a month after the
surrender that he found "on a recent tour of the countryside, that almost every town in East
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war, and on December 17 it declared a unilateral cease-fire after the sur-
render of the Pakistani armed forces.8 This resulted in the rebirth of
East Pakistan into a new independent country, Bangladesh.
India justified its intervention on two grounds: to protect the Ben-
galis from gross and persistent violation of their human rights by the
Pakistani armed forces, and to address the problem of ten million Bengali
refugees on Indian territory. In the Security Council discussion on India's
intervention, the representative of India urged the Council on December
6, 1971, to "consider some realities." 89 He said:
Refugees were a reality. Genocide and oppression were a reality.
The extinction of all civil rights was a reality. Provocation and aggres-
sion of various kinds by Pakistan from March 25 onwards were a real-
ity. Bangladesh itself was a reality, as was its recognition by India.
The Council was nowhere near reality.90
Subsequently, on December 12, he said:
It was not India which declared or started war; it was not India
which was responsible for creating the conditions that led to the pre-
sent unfortunate conflict; it was not India which deliberately and sys-
tematically refused to meet the aspirations of the 75 million people
inhabiting the country, once part of Pakistan; it was not India which
perpetuated the repression, genocide and brutality which provided the
springboard for the freedom movement of Bangla Desh, which led to
the decision of the people of that region to create a free and indepen-
dent nation; it was not India which forsook the long period of nine
months during which a reasonable political settlement could have
been evolved with the leaders and people of Bangla Desh.
The United Nations had been unable to deal with the root cause
of the problem in East Bengal. Informal consultations in the Security
Council in July and August indicated that the international commu-
nity could not, due to limitations born of its commitments to the doc-
trine of domestic jurisdiction, act in the matter. In the face of a direct
violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the provi-
sions of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter by Pakistan, the Security
Council and the United Nations should have found themselves in a
Pakistan had one or more of these graveyards where the Pakistanis killed hundreds of
thousands of Bengalis, apparently often on a daily basis, throughout their 9 months of mili-
tary occupation." Bengalies' Land a Vast Cemetery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1972, at Al, col. 5.
See also East Pakistanis Shot in Reprisal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1971, at Al, col. 2; What's
News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1972 at Al, col. 3; A Journalist is Linked to Murder of Ben-
galis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1972, at Al, col. 6; Day of Terror for 50,000 Bengalis: Thousands
Were Slain, Homes Razed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1971, at A2, col. 6. In Khulna alone, the
number of people killed at one execution site is estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000.
MOTHERLAND (New Delhi), Jan. 30, 1972, at 8, col. 3.
88. See Statement by Mrs. Gandhi on Truce and Surrender, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1971, at A16, col. 5 (Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's statement in the Indian Parliament on
the truce and surrender).
89. UN MONTHLY CHRON., Jan. 1972, at 3, 25.
90. Id.
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position to intervene and persuade Pakistan to return to reason. That
did not happen. While developments proceeded on their inexorable
course towards the present tragedy, the United Nations continued to
be inhibited by considerations of domestic jurisdiction.9 1
After two resolutions calling for a cease-fire were vetoed by the So-
viet Union,92 the Security Council eventually adopted a resolution, decid-
ing to refer the question to the General Assembly,93 as apparently there
were no prospects for a consensus among the major powers.
The Assembly met twice on December 794 and adopted a resolution,
by a vote of 104 in favor to eleven against, with ten abstentions, which
called for an immediate cease-fire and a mutual troop withdrawal by In-
dia and Pakistan.9 5 Since India did not comply with the Assembly recom-
mendations, the Council was again called into session at the request of
the United States. The Council met seven times between December 12
and 21.96 The Soviet Union vetoed one more resolution calling for an im-
mediate cease-fire and troop withdrawal;" and finally the Council
adopted a resolution on December 21, by which it demanded that a dura-
ble cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities on the India-Pakistan sub-
continent be strictly observed until troop withdrawals had taken place.98
Ironically, India had already unilaterally declared a cease-fire on Decem-
ber 17 after the surrender of the Pakistani armed forces.99
This round of Council meetings is of significance only in its rehash of
the earlier arguments. Pakistan accused India of "aggression" and viola-
tion of its territorial integrity, while several representatives called for
both a cease-fire and a political settlement in East Pakistan, referring to
the Pakistan oppression in East Pakistan and the need to acknowledge
the wishes of people in East Pakistan. However, as the eventual surrender
of the Pakistani army became imminent, the tone of the Council debates
shifted from an emphasis on an immediate cease-fire to a fresh concern
for a political settlement. For instance, on the evening of December 15,
1971, the Soviet delegate said that "many delegations had told him per-
sonally that the Soviet approach to the solution of the problem regarding
the interrelationship between cessation of hostilities and a political settle-
ment, was perfectly correct." 100 The delegate from Ceylon (now Sri
91. See id. at 29.
92. See id. at 19, 20.
93. See id. at 25.
94. For a summary report, see id. at 89-91.
95. G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI) (1971). The text is contained in UN MONTHLY CHRON., Jan.
1972, at 91.
96. For a summary report, see id. at 26-45.
97. For the text of the draft resolution, see id. at 28. For voting on the resolution, see
id. at 34.
98. S.C. Res. 307 (1971). For the text, see id. at 45-46.
99. See N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1971, at A16, col. 5 (Prime Minister Gandhi's statement
in the Parliament of India on the truce and surrender).
100. UN MONTHLY CHRON., Jan. 1972, at 38.
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Lanka) considered "a political settlement in East Pakistan to be central
to any solution, and negotiations between the Government of Pakistan
and the acknowledged leaders of the people of East Pakistan to be the
only effective and legitimate means of achieving it."""
Commentators were divided in their response to India's intervention.
Some considered it a valid act of "humanitarian intervention,"'' 2 while
others argued that it was unlawful.'0 3 An observer must, however, con-
clude that there was no doubt regarding the nature or extent of the
Pakistani military's atrocities on Bengalis. The United Nations' inaction
over a period of nine months of continuing onslaught in East Pakistan is
equally well documented. India promptly withdrew its forces. Also, India
was not condemned at the United Nations for its intervention. As to In-
dia's motives, it unquestionably must have welcomed the opportunity to
split Pakistan into two countries and weaken it, thereby minimizing the
perceived threat to India from a strong neighbor. However, in Security
Council discussions, the Indian representative's statement is worth not-
ing, as he said: "We are glad that we have on this particular occasion
nothing but the purest of motives and the purest of intentions: to rescue
the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering.' 0 4
C. Tanzania's 1978 Intervention in Uganda
Throughout Idi Amin's dictatorship of Uganda, the world community
found itself outraged by the gross and consistent pattern of human rights
violations that occurred.' 0 5 Reports of public executions, rape, torture,
and arbitrary arrests surfaced from a variety of sources. 0 6 Estimates were
that nearly 300,000 people perished at the hands of the regime and that
thousands more were forced to flee.' Amnesty International concluded
in its June 1978 report that convincing evidence existed to indicate that
the Ugandan military regime was in fact responsible for these atrocious
violations of human rights.'06
After years of human rights violations in Uganda, as well as a series
of border skirmishes between Tanzania and Uganda, Tanzanian troops,
along with Ugandan exiles and refugees, launched a full scale invasion
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 17-19 (R. Lillich
ed., 1973) (Michael Reisman's comments); TES6N, supra note 1, at 186-87.
103. See, e.g. Franck & Rodley, supra note 30; Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-
Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139 (R. Lillich
ed., 1973).
104. 26 U.N.S.C. Off. Rec., 160th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1606, at 18 (1971).
105. See generally Farooq Hassan, Realpolitik in International Law: After Tanzanian-
Ugandan Conflict "Humanitarian Intervention" Reexamined, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 859
(1981).
106. See Amnesty International, Human Rights in Uganda, Report, June 1978, Doc.
AFR 59/05/78 [hereinafter AI Report].
107. See Hassan, supra note 105, at 896.
108. See AI Report, supra note 106, at 19.
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into Uganda. By April 11, 1979, within four months of the time the inva-
sion began, the mission to overthrow Amin was completed, and the
Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF) had formed a provisional
government."0 9 In spite of the rejoicing by the Ugandans and relief felt by
the world community, this was a transgression of Uganda's sovereignty
that raised the issue of permissible humanitarian intervention.
Undoubtedly, the Amin regime persistently and grossly violated the
basic human rights of the Ugandan people. Amin's barbarous, and well
documented, treatment of Ugandan and foreign nationals alike left little
question as to how extreme the violations had become."' While many
countries condemned the actions of Amin, nothing tangible was done by
the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity to put to an end
the regime's abhorrent conduct. There existed such a widespread loss of
life, as well as many other deprivations of human rights,' that the need
for intervention was apparent.
Tanzania's actions appear, however, to have failed the test of propor-
tionality. Tanzanian troops were without a doubt the decisive element in
Uganda's liberation. 2 Tanzanian troops, which numbered in excess of
20,000, emerged as the ultimate liberators. 3 While Tanzania would have
been justified in protecting exiles and defending its borders from the
Ugandans, the amount of force used to overthrow the incumbent regime
far exceeded that required to accomplish these goals." 4
As to the duration of intervention, months after the fighting ended,
Tanzanian troops still occupied much of the nation they had liberated.
After the intended goal of liberation was accomplished, withdrawal was
slow to occur. It appeared that Tanzanian troops stayed long after their
objectives could be viewed as "humanitarian."""
As to the purpose of intervention, Tanzania's motives seemed to be
partly for humanitarian reasons, but mainly out of self interest. Although
Tanzania "often decried Amin's human rights record," Tanzanian inter-
vention was undertaken not merely to rectify an immediate human rights
problem.' 6 From the outset of the conflict, Tanzania justified its inter-
vention as being a reaction to the armed attack launched by Uganda at
the end of October 1978.117 Tanzania "seemed determined to pursue a
military solution and overthrow Amin's government." ' Had Tanzania
109. NATALINO RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION
AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 102 (1985).
110. See AI Report, supra note 106, at 19.
111. See id. at 12.
112. See Hassan, supra note 105, at 905.
113. See id.
114. See Burrows, Tanzania's Intervention in Uganda: Some Legal Aspects, 35 WORLD
TODAY 306, 308 (1979).
115. See Hassan, supra note 105, at 898.
116. See id. at 893.
117. See RONZITTI, supra note 109, at 102.
118. See Hassan, supra note 105, at 893.
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"sincerely only wanted the Ugandan government to recognize the sanctity
of human life, it should have drastically curtailed its forces following the
fall of Kampala and completely withdrawn after the war."'" 9
The action was also clearly unilateral. Tanzania's President Nyerere
made this clear when he stated: "What we did was exemplary at a time
when the OAU found itself unable to condemn Amin .... When African
nations find themselves collectively incapable of punishing a single coun-
try, then each country has to look after itself.' 120 Although the majority
of the world community would have liked to see Amin removed as presi-
dent, it was only through the actions of the Tanzanian government acting
unilaterally that such a goal was finally accomplished.
Finally, how should alternatives and outcomes be balanced? First, in-
humane treatment and the massive loss of life of Ugandans was a fact.
Second, although many countries had condemned Amin for such gross
violations of human rights, nothing was done to immediately stop them.
Thus, while one could argue that the Tanzanian intervention was not jus-
tified in many respects, it seemed necessary to put an end Amin's egre-
gious behavior. In fact, the Tanzanian action was welcomed by most
members of the world community. 12 1
D. Vietnam's 1978 Intervention in Cambodia
In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge forces took control of the
Kampuchean capital of Phnom Penh and defeated the remains of the re-
publican government.'22 Immediately afterward, the Pol Pot regime be-
gan a program of reorganization that led to human rights violations of the
worst sort.2 3 Reports of torture, killings, and mass deportation became
well documented. 2 " In a three-year period, it is estimated that more than
2 million lives, out of a population of 7 million, were lost through disease,
starvation, and slaughter.'25
In spite of the outrage by the international community, no concrete
measures were taken "to prevent the continued perpetration of atrocities
in Kampuchea."' 26 Instead, reports continued of how hundreds of
119. Id. at 894.
120. Cited in S.K. Chatterjee, Some Legal Problems of Support Role in International
Law: Tanzania and Uganda, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 755, 757 (1981).
121. See id. at 767.
122. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 1, at 551.
123. See RONZIrrI, supra note 109, at 98.
124. For a more detailed account, see Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on
East-Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Current Situ-
ation in Indochina: Regional Political Developments; The Cambodian- Vietnamese Con-
flicts; Refugee Problems; S. Res. 323, Relating to Human Rights in Cambodia, and S. Res.
469, Concerning the Inhumane Acts of the Government of Cambodia Against the People of
Cambodia, Aug. 21, 1978, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter Hearing on East Asia].
125. Id.
126. See RONZITTI, supra note 109, at 98.
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thousands of refugees were still fleeing to neighboring countries.'1 7 Fi-
nally, on December 25, 1978, the Vietnamese army, along with the Popu-
lar Liberation Front (PLF), invaded Kampuchea and gained control of
the government."18 The invasion marked the end of the Pol Pot regime
and the installation of the Vietnamese-supported Peoples' Republic of
Kampuchea.
There exists no doubt that the Kampuchean people suffered some of
the most egregious human rights violations ever documented. Their case
under the Khmer Rouge regime became "a perfect candidate for humani-
tarian intervention.""' 9 Undoubtedly, gross and persistent human rights
violations occurred, along with alleged acts of genocide, as is evidenced by
the deaths of nearly one-third of the Kampuchean population during the
Pol Pot regime. As stated by the chairman of the United Nations Human
Rights Subcommission, the human rights violations by the Khmer Rouge
were "the most serious to have occurred anywhere since Nazism. "130
The Vietnamese invasion failed the test of proportionality.
Thousands of Vietnamese troops were used to overthrow the Khmer
Rouge and were the virtual creators of the PLF."1 1 The Vietnamese were,
in essence, controlling operations, and even a decade after the invasion
continued to keep troops and advisors in Kampuchea.' 3 The amount of
force used and the duration of intervention can in no way be justified as
merely humanitarian, considering the massive role the Vietnamese played
in overthrowing the Khmer Rouge.
As to the motives of the Vietnamese, there is some doubt as to
whether their purpose was in fact merely humanitarian. The Vietnamese
were known to harbor territorial ambitions over Kampuchea, and were
themselves frequent abusers of human rights.1 3' In fact, Vietnam had at
first "denied that it had even invaded Kampuchea," and later asserted
that they never even gave military help to the PLF.13' These flagrantly
incredible remarks, combined with the violent and hostile attitudes the
Vietnamese and Pol Pot's regime had for each other,"" were strong in-
dicators that Vietnam's intervention was undertaken for other than hu-
manitarian reasons.
The Vietnamese acted unilaterally, without seeking "the assistance of
any other nation when invading Kampuchea. Moreover, before taking
unilateral action, Vietnam did not ask for approval of the United Nations
127. See Hearing on East-Asia, supra note 124, at 11.
128. See Note, Kampuchea: Representation and Recognition, 30 INT'L L. & COMP. L.Q.
234 (1981).
129. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 608.
130. See id. at 552.
131. See RONZITTI, supra note 109, at 99.
132. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 609.
133. See id. at 608.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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or any regional organization."1 36 In fact, the majority of the international
community, with the exception of the Soviet Union and some of its al-
igned states, openly condemned Vietnam's actions and refused to recog-
nize the new government.3 7
It must be added that the international community, including the
United Nations, took no effective action to respond to the tragedy in
Kampuchea. It took three years to get the issue of human rights viola-
tions by the Khmer Rouge on the United Nations' agenda.13 8 Even then,
actions were postponed. There was no diplomatic solution available; only
the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea put an end to Pol Pot's regime. 13 9
E. The 1983 U.S. Intervention in Grenada140
On October 25, 1983, the United States led an armed intervention in
Grenada; assisting 1,900 U.S. troops were 300 soldiers from six Caribbean
states."" In announcing the landing of these troops in Grenada, President
Reagan said that the action was taken in response to "an urgent, formal
request" from the five-member Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) "to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy" in
Grenada.4 He justified the U.S. action, in part, on the ground that it was
needed to protect American lives.' 3
The invasion force, which eventually grew to 7,000, met little resis-
tance and succeeded in just three days in securing "all significant military
objectives . . . including the two airports, the campuses of the St. George's
University School of Medicine, the Governor-General's residence, the ra-
dio and power stations, Forts Frederick and Rupert, and the Richmond
Hill prison."' 4 4 Within a week, the remaining pockets of resistance were
136. Id.
137. See RONZIrri, supra note 109, at 99.
138. See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 553.
139. See Eric Lane, Mass Killing by Governments: Lawful in the World Legal Order?,
12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 239, 276 (1979).
140. I have relied extensively on my prior work, Ved Nanda, The United States Armed
Intervention in Grenada - Impact on World Order, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 395 (1984). See
also TES6N, supra note 1, 188-99; Gordon, Bilder, Rovine & Wallace, International Law and
the United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 INT'L LAW. 331 (1984) [hereinafter Re-
port]; Isaak I. Dore, The U.S. Invasion of Grenada: Resurrection of the "Johnson Doc-
trine?," 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 173 (1984); Doswald-Beck, The Legality of the U.S. Interven-
tion in Grenada, 31 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 362-66 (1984); John Moore, Grenada and the
International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984); Christopher Joiner, The
United States Action in Grenada - Reflections on the Lawfulness of the Invasion, id. at
131; see also Detlev F. Vagts, International Law Under Time Pressure: Grading the Gre-
nada Take-Home Examination, id. at 169.
141. See Assault Force Spearheaded by U.S. Troops Invades Grenada and Seizes
Both Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1983, at 1, col. 1, 6.
142. Grenada - A Preliminary Report 1 (Dept. of State and Dept. of Defense, Wash.
D.C., Dec. 16, 1983) [hereinafter Grenada Rep.].
143. See id.
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eliminated.' 45 United States casualties included eighteen killed and 116
wounded in action, while forty-five Grenadian civilians were killed and
337 wounded, and twenty-four Cubans were killed in action and fifty-nine
wounded.' 46 The U.S. forces began withdrawing from the island in early
November 1983.'14 The last 950 U.S. Combat troops left Grenada in mid-
December, seven weeks after the invasion.'
48
On November 3, 1983, the Queen's representative and the only civil-
ian authority on the island announced that he would appoint a broad-
based nonpolitical interim government, and expressed hope that elections
to form a government would take place within six months.' 9 An interim
governing council was appointed on November 9, 1983, and sworn in on
November 15.' 0 The Council promised to hold elections "as soon as prac-
tical," and its legal adviser announced that a state of emergency imposed
in Grenada after the U.S. invasion had been lifted. The Council estab-
lished an Advisory Tribunal to review the cases of persons under deten-
tion and, after reviewing these cases, the tribunal decided that thirty-nine
prisoners should continue in detention.' 5 ' Following the invasion, Gre-
nada began receiving foreign economic assistance, the bulk of which was
provided by the United States. 52
For several months preceding the intervention, Grenada's Marxist re-
gime was torn by internal dissension. On October 14, 1983, Prime Minis-
ter Maurice Bishop was placed under house arrest. On October 19, a
crowd freed Bishop and proceeded to Fort Rupert. Bishop took over the
Fort while the crowd disarmed the garrison. In a few hours, the
Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army troops captured Bishop, as well
as three of his ministers and two union leaders, brought them into the
Fort's courtyard and executed them.
Subsequent events included the formation of a Revolutionary Mili-
tary Council (RMC) headed by General Austin, an official proclamation
of a round-the-clock, shoot-on-sight curfew, more arrests, the closing of
the Pearls Airport, and the cancellation of flights. During the next five
days there was disorder in Grenada. International journalists and diplo-
145. See, e.g., U.S. Troops Patrol as Grenada Edges Closer to Normal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
146. Grenada Rep., supra note 142, at 1.
147. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1983, at A7, col. 2, for the statement by U.S. Ambas-
sador to Grenada, Charles A. Gillespie, claiming that the number of remaining troops had
"already been cut down to around 1,000."
148. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1983, at Al, col. 2; Editorial, Remember Grenada?,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1983, at 24, col. 1; Grenada Rep., supra note 142, at 1.
149. See New Government for Grenada Due Early Next Week, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1983, at Al, col. 4. See also Grenadian Aide of U.N. Says He Will Form an Interim Gov-
ernment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1983, at A8, col. 1.
150. See David Shribman, 5 Sworn in to Governing Council for Grenada, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1983, at A5.
151. Grenada Collective Action, GIST, Jan. 1984, at 2 (U.S. Dept. of State).
152. Id.
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mats were not permitted entry into the country. However, on October 22,
1983, two U.S. diplomats from Barbados arrived on a charter flight to
discuss evacuation of U.S. nationals. Two more U.S. diplomats arrived by
another charter flight on October 23. The Grenadian authorities denied
that there was any need for evacuation. On October 24, a few small planes
were allowed to land and depart, but the airport was not open to normal
traffic. The invasion occurred the next day.
U.N. Security Council discussion on the issue was spirited. The inva-
sion was condemned "with varying degrees of harshness" by most of the
speakers, and defended only by a small number of Caribbean States. 5 '
On October 28, 1983, the Council's vote on a resolution deploring the in-
vasion was eleven in favor, one (the United States) against, and three
(Britain, Togo, and Zaire) abstaining. 54 The resolution, vetoed by the
United States, stated that the Security Council "DEEPLY DEPLORES
the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation
of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of that State." '55 The resolution also called for "an immediate
cessation of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of the
foreign troops from Grenada."' 56 Subsequently, on November 2, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted a resolution virtually identical to the Security
Council Resolution of October 28 by a recorded vote of 108 in favor to
nine against, with twenty-seven abstentions.'57 In a separate recorded
vote of seventy-one in favor to twenty-three against, with forty-one ab-
stentions, the Assembly approved a Belgian amendment calling for free
elections in Grenada "as rapidly as possible to choose its government
democratically."' 58
On November 6, 1983, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that he
had sent Diego Cordovez, Under Secretary-General for Special Political
Affairs, to Grenada where he held a number of consultations during his
stay.'59 Among the items discussed were the multinational force estab-
lished by the OECS (numbering about 300 and supported by a U.S. Task
Force on land and off-shore), withdrawal of the U.S. combat forces, for-
mation of an Advisory Council by Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon, and
preparations for general elections.'60
On the day following the intervention, the Permanent Council of the
153. See Richard Bernstein, U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution 'Deploring' Grenada Inva-
sion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
154. Id.
155. Operative Paragraph 1 of the Resolution, reprinted in Text of the U.N. Resolu-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1983, at 4, col. 3.
156. Id. at Operative Paragraph 4.
157. See Assembly Calls for Cessation of "Armed Intervention" in Grenada, UN
MONTHLY CHRON., Jan. 1984, at 4 [hereinafter Cessation].
158. Id.
159. U.N. Doc. A/38/568, Nov. 6, 1983. For a summary of the report, see Cessation,
supra note 157, at 5.
160. Id.
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Organization of American States met in an extraordinary session. ' At
that session, representatives of several Latin American States, including
Colombia and Argentina, criticized the action in Grenada on the ground
that it was in violation of the principle of nonintervention as embodied in
the OAS Charter.
Criticism of the United States' action was muted for several reasons.
First, the invading forces struck fast and decisively, crushing the initial
resistance and taking over the island with a minimum cost in lives and
property."6 2 This was possible because the Revolutionary Military Council
(RMC), which had taken over on October 19, 1983,63 received no external
military assistance except for the help of the Cubans already on the is-
land."" Second, the population of Grenada responded favorably, indeed
enthusiastically, to the invasion."6 5 Subsequent events in Grenada, such
as the withdrawal of the occupying troops and the formation of an in-
terim government,' 6 were perhaps additionally responsible for a modifi-
cation of the positions taken by critics.
The Reagan administration consistently argued that its intervention
in Grenada was justified, in part, on humanitarian grounds. Following
President Reagan's invocation of the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion,'6 7 other Government officials relied on humanitarian intervention to
justify the United States action.
To illustrate, in his news conference on October 25, 1983, Secretary
of State Schultz asserted that one of the reasons for the President's deci-
sion to commit U.S. forces in Grenada was "[t]o secure the safety of
American citizens - and, for that matter, the citizens of other countries
- and to assure that any who wish to leave may do so. '68 The next day,
at a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, Ambassador Middendorf
expressed the "particularly humanitarian concern" of the United States
in the following words:
The deteriorating conditions on the island posed a threat to the
continued safety of U.S. citizens there, who number 800-1,000, largely
consisting of medical school students and faculty. There is substantial
precedent for military action to ensure the safety of foreign nationals
161. For transcript, see OEA/Ser. G Doc. CP/ACTA 543/83 (1983).
162. For a report on casualties, see Grenada Rep., supra note 142, at 1.
163. See id. at 36.
164. See, e.g., id. at 1; Michael T. Kaufman, Grenada Troops Pressing Battle Around
Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 5.
165. See, e.g., Dennis Volman, Grenadians Welcome U.S. Troops and Aid, THE CHRIS-
TIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 3, 1983, at 9, col. 1; Adam Clymer, Grenadians Welcomed
Invasion, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1983, at A21; L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1983. Pt. 1, at
1, col. 1.
166. See, e.g., Grenada Rep., supra note 142, at 1; Grenadians Named to a Ruling
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1983, at A10.
167. See Grenada: Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Dec. 1983, at 67, 68 [hereinafter, Grenada: Collective Action](remarks of President Reagan).
168. Id. at 69 (Secretary Schultz's news conference).
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in such conditions of disorder. While there have been no specific
threats against U.S. citizens, a number had sought to flee, even in the
absence of organized evacuation efforts, at great risk. The military
council on the island had promised to reopen the airport on October
24 but did not do so, thus heightening concern over the continued
welfare of these citizens. The lack of respect for human rights and the
degenerating conditions, of course, also posed a threat to other foreign
nationals, and indeed, to the people of Grenada. 69
The U.S. Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Ambas-
sador Kirkpatrick, made similar statements at sessions of the United Na-
tions Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly.1 70 Ken-
neth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, on November 4, 1983, presented
the clearest legal brief for the United States' position:
U.S. action to secure and evacuate endangered U.S. citizens on
the island was undertaken in accordance with well-established princi-
ples of international law regarding the protection of one's nationals.
That the circumstances warranted this action has been amply docu-
mented by the returning students themselves. There is absolutely no
requirement of international law that compelled the United States to
await further deterioration of the situation that would have jeopard-
ized a successful operation. Nor was the United States required to
await actual violence against U.S. citizens before rescuing them from
the anarchic and threatening conditions the students themselves have
described. 171
The uncontroverted facts are that the rescue mission of the U.S.
medical students was completed within a few days after the U.S.-led
forces landed in Grenada. The U.S. forces, however, remained on the is-
land long after U.S. nationals had been evacuated. 17 2 On two other factual
issues, however, there is some controversy. One pertains to the nature of
the threat to U.S. nationals, that is, whether it was imminent. The other
relates to the airport operations out of Grenada on October 24, that is,
whether American medical students were free to leave Grenada if they
wished to do so."'
Granting the validity of the Reagan administration's assertion that
the lives of U.S. nationals were endangered and that the situation in Gre-
nada was so chaotic that the promises of the military rulers could not
have been trusted,7 4 there simply is no justification on humanitarian
169. See id. at 73 (Ambassador Middendorf's statement).
170. See id. at 74-76 (Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement).
171. Id. at 79, 81 (Deputy Secretary Dam's remarks).
172. Although the rescue mission was completed within the first three days, the last
combat troops remained on the island for two and a half months longer, withdrawing in
mid-December.
173. See, e.g., Was the U.S. Invasion Necessary?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1983, Pt. IV, at 1,
col. 1.
174. See Hedrick Smith, Ex-U.S. Official Cites Ease in Leaving Grenada Day Before
Invasion, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, for a statement by the White House spokesman,
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grounds for the continued presence and activities of U.S. troops in Gre-
nada after the rescue operations were completed during the first few days
of the military action.
F. The 1989 U.S. Intervention in Panama17 5
U.S. military forces landed in Panama on December 20, 1989. Presi-
dent Bush explained that General Manuel Noriega had declared "a state
of war with the United States and publicly threatened the lives of Ameri-
cans in Panama. 1 7 6 This, he said, had been followed by the murder of an
unarmed American serviceman by Noriega's forces and the beatings and
harassment of others. He added that, as General Noriega's "reckless
threats and attacks upon Americans in Panama" had created an "immi-
nent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama," he, as Presi-
dent, was obligated "to safeguard the lives of American citizens. 1 77
Subsequently, on January 3, 1990, when Noriega was en route to
Homestead Air Force Base in Florida, President Bush declared that he
had accomplished all four objectives for which he had ordered U.S. troops
to Panama. These were "to safeguard the lives of American Citizens, to
help restore democracy, to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal
treaties, and to bring General Manuel Noriega to justice.' 17
As to the validity of the humanitarian intervention claim,' 79 tensions
between Panama and the United States had been steadily rising even
prior to Noriega's annulment of the May 1989 elections, and tensions had
further escalated in the week preceding the armed invasion.'"0 On Decem-
ber 15, 1989, Panama's legislature adopted a resolution formally declaring
the country to be in a state of war with the United States. Noriega was
named "Maximum Leader" and given sweeping new powers. According to
the resolution, the move was prompted by U.S. "aggression" and the eco-
nomic sanctions in effect against Panama since 1988."1' The Bush admin-
istration, however, described the Assembly's action as "another hollow
step in an attempt to force his [Noriega's] rule on the Panamanian peo-
Larry Speakes, who stated, "What they told us, we simply did not trust. There was no way
we could be at all assured that their promises would have been kept."
175. See generally Ved P. Nanda et al., AGORA: U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders,
Aggressors or Human Rights Activists?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990)[hereinafter AGORA].
176. President's Address to the Nation Announcing United States Military Action in
Panama, 25 WEEKLY CoMp. PRES. Doc. 1974 (Dec. 20, 1989).
177. Id.
178. President's Remarks Announcing the Surrender of General Manuel Noriega to
United States Authorities in Panama, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 8 (Jan. 3, 1990).
179. I have borrowed from my earlier analysis in AGORA, supra note 175, at 496-97.
180. See e.g., Steve C. Ropp, Military Retrenchment and Decay in Panama, CURRENT
HIsT., Jan. 1990, at 17; Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Troops Move In Panama In Effort to Seize
Noriega; Gunfire is Heard in Capital - Ordered by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1989, at Al.
181. See William Branigin, Noriega Appointed 'Maximum Leader'; Panama Says
State of War Exists with U.S., WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1989, at A21.
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ple."' 82 Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger called it "a charade and
nonsense."' 8 3 In another public statement, a White House spokesman an-
nounced that U.S. troops "had not changed their alert status because of
the declaration."'" 4 Yet tension continued to build in the country as con-
frontations between Panamanians and Americans increased.
Noriega's "declaration of war" against the United States was a clear
provocation. Following the invasion, Secretary of State Baker cited an un-
verified "intelligence report that General Noriega was considering mount-
ing an urban commando attack on American citizens in a residential
neighborhood," and added:
I cannot prove to you that this report was absolutely reliable, but
I do know that if the President had failed to act as he did and
Noriega's Dignity Battalions had killed or terrorized a dozen Ameri-
can families in Panama, you would be asking us today why didn't you
act to prevent this kind of violence against our citizens?' 86
Granted that the situation was tense and the U.S. was provoked, yet
these facts alone provide little legal justification for the invasion under
the test of "necessity." Nor can a full-scale invasion be considered a pro-
portional response. The state of tension existing in Panama did not pre-
sent an imminent danger to U.S. citizens. The most serious incident sup-
posedly precipitating the invasion occurred on December 15 when one
U.S. Marine officer was killed by members of the Panamanian Defense
Force, another was wounded, and a third was beaten and his wife
threatened at a roadblock. A second serious incident before the invasion
occurred when an American officer shot and wounded a Panamanian po-
lice officer, who, the American claimed, appeared to be reaching for a
gun.18
These incidents are important, but on humanitarian grounds the U.S.
response did not warrant the launching of "Operation Just Cause" - a
full-scale invasion of a size not seen since the Vietnam War, eventually
consisting of 12,000 American invaders (added to the approximately
12,000 U.S. military personnel already stationed in Panama), helicopter
gunships, artillery and other heavy firepower.' The military attack re-
sulted in the death of twenty-six Americans and over 700 Panamanians,
mostly civilians, in addition to severe and widespread physical devasta-
182. See Opposition Leader in Panama Rejects a Peace Offer from Noriega, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1989, at A5, col. 1 [hereinafter Peace Offer].
183. See Noriega gets new powers, title in Panama, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1989, at C8.
184. See Peace Offer, supra note 182. Assuming the United States was planning its
invasion during the weekend of this announcement, the Government would not have wanted
to disclose its plans.
185. Excerpts from Statement by Baker on U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1989, at
A19.
186. See e.g., George J. Church, Showing Muscle, TIME, Jan. 1, 1990, at 20, 23.
187. See Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. Forces Gain Wide Control in Panama; New Leaders
Put In, But Noriega Gets Away, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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tion, property damage and dislocation.188
In evaluating the validity of the U.S. response, one must acknowledge
that the United States failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that
the invasion was necessary to protect U.S. lives. But assuming that some
level of intervention was justified, the scale of the operation and the pro-
longed period of intervention, coupled with the other objectives cited for
the invasion, cast serious doubt on its having been a legitimate case of
humanitarian intervention.
Based on these case studies, I offer the following criteria to evaluate
the permissibility of intervention on humanitarian grounds:
1. The Severity of the Rights Violations - The Necessity Criterion
a. Genocide
b. Gross, Persistent and Systematic Violations of Basic Human
Rights
2. The Nature of the Intervention - The Proportionality Criterion
a. Duration
b. Was the force proper/excessive?
3. The Purpose of the Intervention
a. Humanitarian Concern?
b. Self-interest?
c. Mixed?
4. Was the action:
a. Collective?
b. Unilateral?
5. Balancing Alternatives and Outcomes
a. Does the intervention maximize the best outcomes? 89
IV. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO THE KURDISH SITUATION
A. The Kurdish Crisis
This crisis began with the Kurdish insurrection in the aftermath of
the Gulf War.' 90 As the Iraqi forces, especially the Republican Guard,
188. See Army says 'disciplined fire' cut Panama's civilian toll, DENVER POST, Jan. 21,
1990, at A13, col. 3; Panama may get $1 billion in aid, DENVER POST, Jan. 25, 1990, at A2,
col. 4.
189. See, e.g., ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 62-66 (2d ed. 1984).
190. See Wounded Iraq, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1991, at 10; Old Enemies Come To-
gether Against the Common Foe, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1991, at 37; In the Backwash of
the Gulf, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 1991, at 43; The Kurds Bid for Freedom, THE ECONO-
MIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 37.
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suppressed the uprising,""1 approximately two million Kurds fled Saddam
Hussein's terror; 2 Turkey and Iran opened their borders to the fleeing
refugees.' 93 Iraq's protest against interference in its internal affairs not-
withstanding, the United States, Great Britain, and France initially pro-
vided relief operations and later sent their armed forces to carve out "safe
havens" for displaced Kurds in northern Iraq. 9" As the Kurds were un-
willing to return to their homes without a foreign presence to ensure their
protection, Iraq consented to the stationing of United Nations guards in
its northern territory. Earlier, the U.N. Security Council adopted a reso-
lution '9 demanding that Iraq "immediately end [the] repression" of the
Kurds,'" and insisting that Iraq "allow immediate access by international
humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts
of Iraq ... ."97
Informal "safe havens" were established where aid and refuge could
be given to the Kurds.198 The enclave developed through the initial warn-
ing by the U.S. prohibiting Iraqi military maneuvers in the Kurdish areas
north of the 36th parallel, followed by the movement of U.S. and other
coalition forces in the region, and the establishment of refugee camps for
the Kurds.'9 9 The design was to provide assurance to the Kurds that the
refugee camps were secure so that they would return to their homes.2 00
B. Application of the Suggested Criteria
The foreign intervention in Iraq meets the criteria suggested here to
judge the validity of "humanitarian intervention." The sole purpose was
to provide relief to the Kurds and to protect them from the Iraqi army,
and consequently to ensure that relief operations were not at risk.2"' Pres-
ident Bush expressly stated that the effort was purely "humanitarian,"
and the operation would consist of temporary relief stations to encourage
the Kurds to move to areas where they could be provided with food,
clothing, and medicine.20 Mr. Bush further stated that the move by the
allied forces was not the initial step toward an occupation of Iraqi terri-
tory.20 3 The United Nations was to monitor the entire process so as to
191. See Guess Who's Still Running Iraq, THE EcONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1991, at 39.
192. See, e.g., Want Another War?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 1991, at 12.
193. See id.
194. See Sanctuary for the Kurds, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 1991, at 12; Calvary to the
Rescue, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 1991, at 41.
195. See S/RES/688, supra note 3.
196. Id., Operative Paragraph 2.
197. Id., Operative Paragraph 3.
198. See Patrick E. Tyler, Bush Sees Accord on 'Safe Havens' for Kurds in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1991, at Al, col 3.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See Elaine Sciolino, New Activity by Military Purely Humanitarian, President
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
202. See id.
203. See id.
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ensure that relief efforts would be undertaken in conformity with the pur-
pose and spirit of Security Council Resolution 688.2'0
Hundreds of thousands of Kurds had already fled into Turkey and
Iraq, with predictions that over two million would eventually leave Iraq,
when the initiative was taken by Europeans urging an enclave for the
Kurds.2 05 The Kurds fled in such large numbers because of their prior
experience with the brutal use of chemical weapons on their villages by
the Iraqi army and a history of oppression of the Kurds as an ethnic
group by the Iraqi government, especially by the Saddam Hussein re-
gime. 2°" According to some estimates, starvation and exposure were claim-
ing lives of over 1,000 Kurdish refugees daily.207 The world community
was shocked: there was consensus on the need for urgent action to aid
and protect the refugees.
In view of the pattern of gross and persistent violation of the Kurds'
human rights in Iraq, the claim for humanitarian intervention on their
behalf meets the first criterion set out above, that is, severity of the dep-
rivation of their human rights. Urgent action was needed to save lives.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 insisted that Iraq allow immediate
humanitarian access for relief purposes, and condemned the Iraqi repres-
sion of the Kurds, which threatened international peace and security.0 8
As to the second criterion, the nature of the intervention, Britain's
Ambassador to the United Nations, Sir David Hannay, explicitly stated
that the proposed safe havens were a "humanitarian concept. '20 9 The du-
ration of the intervention lasted until July 15, 1991.210 As efforts from the
beginning were underway to seek U.N. replacements, 211 the coalition force
was indeed proportionate to ward off the risk to the lives of the hundreds
of thousands of Kurds.
As to the third criterion, the purpose of intervention, the plans spe-
cifically embodied a limited purpose of securing a safe region for the
Kurds so that they could receive humanitarian aid and return to their
homes. 12 The coalition forces did not intend to affect Iraq's territorial
204. See Elaine Sciolino, Kurds Will Die in Vast Numbers Without Swift Aid, Agen-
cies Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at Al, col. 4.
205. See Alan Riding, Europeans Urging Enclave for Kurds in Northern Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
206. See Chuck Sudetic, As Kurds Limp Back in, Ghost Town Relives '88, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1991, at A8, col. 5; Alan Cowell, Kurdish Refugees, by Thousands, Flee Vengeance
of the Iraq Army, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1991, at Al, col. 4.
207. See Patrick Tyler, U.S. Scouting Refugee Sites Well Inside Iraq's Border, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at Al, col. 6.
208. See S/RES/688, supra note 3, Operative Paragraphs 1, 3.
209. See Paul Lewis, Europeans Back Off Plan to Help Kurds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1991, at A12, col. 1.
210. See John Murray Brown, Last Allies Pull Out of North Iraq, FINANCIAL TIMES,
July 16, 1991, at 6, col. 3.
211. See Sciolino, supra note 201.
212. See Tyler, supra note 198.
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integrity, nor even Saddam Hussein's regime.2 13 They had planned for an
early withdrawal date,214 and accordingly withdrew on July 15.215
At the outset of the intervention, the allied leaders agreed to provide
protection to the relief workers as authorized by the Security Council
Resolution 688.216 Another goal was to protect the Kurds. Consequently,
they felt it necessary to station troops to curtail the movement of Iraqi
forces north of the 36th parallel.21 7 Iraq was warned not to use ground or
air forces anywhere near the Kurdish refugees.2 1 8
As to the fourth criterion, that is, whether the action is unilateral or
collective, the initiative came from the British Prime Minister, John Ma-
jor, but intervention took a collective form after consultations among the
Security Council members.219 A European Community delegation met
with President Bush in efforts to gain further support for the plan as a
collective action.220 The decision was made to establish a multinational
force to provide the needed relief.2 '
Security Council Resolution 688 expressed grave concern at the re-
pression of the Iraqi civilian population, and the massive flow of refugees
"threaten[ing] international peace and security in the region," '222 and au-
thorized humanitarian access and assistance to the refugees and displaced
Iraqi people.2 2 3 Although the intervening force was not under the U.N.
auspices, there were consultations at the United Nations and considerable
international support for the operation which drew over 20,000 troops
from 13 countries. 2 4 Subsequently, the United Nations and Iraq signed
an agreement, under which U.N. security guards would move into north-
ern Iraq, allowing the U.S. and allied soldiers to withdraw.22 5
Finally, on balancing alternatives and outcomes, one has to conclude
that the intervention was a justified response, for without the presence of
the allied forces the Kurds were not willing to return to their villages and
homes. After the Kurds' return and the withdrawal of the allied forces, a
residual coalition force is to be stationed in Turkey to deter future Iraqi
213. See David Hoffman, Allied Mission Among Kurds Unsettled as Northern Iraq
Safe Zones Expand, WASH. POST, May 5, 1991, at A39, col. 1.
214. See Sciolino, supra note 201.
215. See Brown, supra note 210.
216. See S/RES/688, supra note 3, Operative Paragraghs 1-5; see also Neil A. Lewis,
Legal Scholars Debate Refugee Plan, Generally Backing U.S. Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1991, at A8, col. 1.
217. See Sciolino, supra note 201.
218. See Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Warns Against Attack by Iraq on Kurdish Refugees,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at A10, col. 1.
219. See Riding, supra note 205.
220. See Tyler, supra note 198.
221. See id.
222. See S/RES/688, supra note 3, preamble.
223. See id., Operative Paragraghs 3-5.
224. See Brown, supra note 210.
225. See, e.g., Security-Force Pact is Settled with Iraq, Official at U.N. Says, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1991, at A8, col. 6.
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aggression against the Kurds.22 6 Head of the coalition forces, General
Shalikashvali, said that the allied forces retained the right to conduct re-
connaissance flights north of the 36th parallel where Iraq is banned from
flying fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.21 7 The intervention gave the
Kurds breathing space to negotiate with the Iraqi government an agree-
ment for autonomy in their region.2"'
V. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Having concluded that the intervention in Iraq meets the criteria set
out above to determine the validity of "humanitarian intervention" under
customary international law, this interventionary action has serious im-
plications. For example, could the world community take action to pro-
vide food and humanitarian assistance to the starving population in a
state in opposition to that state's policy? Recent developments with a
bearing on the subject include a General Assembly resolution adopted in
December 1990 which calls for international relief corridors. '29 In the
United States Congress, Congressman Tony Hall introduced a bill asking
the United States government to take the initiative for the drafting and
negotiation of an international convention on the right to food.23
The following statement of the International Court of Justice in Nic-
aragua v. U.S. is pertinent: "There can be no doubt that the provision of
strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country,
whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as
unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international
law." 3 ' Could a single state intervene? Could force be justified to provide
food to a starving population under the rubric of "humanitarian
intervention"?
It is recommended that, as a last resort, such use of force be consid-
ered justified. The allied forces' response to the Kurdish crisis has
demonstrated that in the post-cold war era "humanitarian intervention"
remains a viable alternative. That it should be sparingly used is appropri-
ate. But that it can be used should prove a powerful deterrent to oppres-
sive regimes.
226. See Brown, supra note 210.
227. See id.
228. See, e.g., Iraqi Kurds Bargain Hard as Allies Leave, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 15, 1991, at 4.
229. See G.A. Res. 45/100, adopted on Dec. 14, 1990.
230. See, e.g., George D. Moffett III, US Congressmen Pressure UN to Outlaw Denial
of Food, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 5, 1991, at 6, col. 1.
231. 1986 I.C.J. 14, 124.
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